Introduction

    The Cosmos Hub ("Gaia") has an on-chain governance mechanism for passing text proposals, changing consensus parameters, and spending funds from the community pool.

    This repository provides background information on these different kinds of proposals and best-practices for drafting them and proposing them on-chain. It also provides a place for collaborating on draft proposals in plain text on Github.

    If you'd like to draft a proposal, start here. See the contents below for more background on the governance system, the different types of proposals, and how to submit one.

    ATOM stakers can find active on-chain proposals to vote on here. Read more…

    Proposal #82 summary

    We suggest a new Cosmos Hub vision statement, a companion to the 2017 article that focused on IBC-connected chains. The Hub's original vision has been realized with the Cosmos Stack (Tendermint, IBC, and SDK) and critical technologies for secure economic scalability (Interchain Security and Liquid Staking). This document signals the transfer to the Cosmos Hub as an infrastructure service platform and ATOM's renewed role as preferred collateral within the Cosmos Network. Interchain Scheduler and Interchain Allocator are app-specific features that accelerate interchain growth. Interchain Scheduler is a cross-chain block space marketplace that earns MEV money. Interchain Allocator uses these profits to capitalize new Cosmos chains, stimulate interchain collaboration, and extend the Scheduler's addressable market. After a 36-month transition phase, exponential issuance is lowered to a consistent amount of ATOM released per month. The report proposes forming Cosmos Councils to create and operate the plan. Cosmos Councils compose the Cosmos Assembly, an ATOM-accountable entity responsible for setting yearly goals, resourcing, and administering Cosmos Hub activities.

    Elections

    The following summarizes the vote options and proposal:

    Yes, you want to ratify the proposed paper.

    No, You don't like the paper's content. Explain why on Cosmos Hub.

    NO WITH VETO - A 'NoWithVeto' vote indicates a proposal is spam, irrelevant to Cosmos Hub, disproportionately infringes on minority interests, or violates or encourages violation of Cosmos Hub's rules of engagement. If more than a third of votes are "NoWithVeto," the plan is rejected and deposits are burnt.

    ABSTAIN - You contribute to quorum but don't vote for or against the measure.

    Method

    Initial conditions of TX STATUS='SUCCEEDED' and proposal id=82 were applied in the osmosis.core.fact governance votes table. I have collected the information about OSMO stakers that is required to cast a vote on the Osmosis chain in regard to proposition #82.

    Then, I made the following queries and histograms to compare proposals #1 through #100, and then proposals #82 through the most recent proposal (#378).

    • Daily totals and bar graphs You can see how many people have voted in the ATOM election, how many people have voted more than once, and how many people have switched their vote.
    • Three histograms of ATOM voters: total, repeat, and switch voters

    Also I used osmosis.core.dim_labels to find the validators address and track their vote casting on Proposal #82

    Analysis

    :hourglass_flowing_sand: Prop #82 Overall View

    The single numbers on the right show the total number of voters, total votes, and total count of voters, including those who voted more than once.

    In addition, the PIE charts below show that 1196 votes were cast to say "yes" by 1046 different voters.

    And 299 people voted no, casting 327 votes.

    In total, 1565 unique voters have cast 1810 votes on Prop. 82.

    ✍🏻 Conclusion

    As of Findings above:

    • Some 243 votes were swapped out of a total of 1,810 cast for proposition #82.
    • People who voted for proposal #82 had an average ATOM wallet volume of 60.8 $ATOM.
    • There was a significant majority of voters whose smallest wallet size was less than 5 $ATOM who cast their ballots in all four categories.
    • Only one of the 42 voting addresses belonged to a validator, while the rest belonged to normal voters.
    • The average tallied vote for all other propositions was identical to that of prop #82, and both the tallied vote and the number of voters were under 4000 and 3000.
    • After proposal #82, the number of votes cast and the number of voters drastically surged to over 57,000 and 52,800, respectively, until dropping to under 20,000 for the most recent proposal, #378.

    And finally, I’m glad to share this research with those who care about this issue via Twitter link, and will be pleased by your comments.

    About:

    Governance in the Cosmos Hub

    Governance in the Cosmos Hub has gotten spicy, to say the least. Despite gaining the support of some of the most influential names in the space, Prop #82 was rejected after more than 1/3 of voters chose "NoWithVeto".

    Take a look at governance behavior surrounding Proposal #82 - specifically first time voters and vote switching. Is it possible to identify any key "swing voters" (ie ATOM whales or influential validators) that really turned the tide of the vote? Were any of them first-time voters?

    What is the average wallet size (in ATOM) of the people voting? Of the people who changed their vote? Further, is Prop #82 significantly different than other proposals from an engagement perspective? Analyze voting for Cosmos #82 vs. other recent governance proposals in the Hub. Has overall governance participation increased or decrease since Prop #82?

    Finally, have ATOM holders re-delegated their staked ATOM as a result of the vote? Highlight any interesting patterns in re-delegation activity.

    Hey there 👋!

    Firstly, I appreciate you sticking with it until the conclusion.

    I'm Hamed, a civil engineering Ph.D.

    student interested in data analysis.

    I've made many similar dashboards and visualizations since I started at Flipside in January.

    Please take a look at my various contact details and let me know what you think.

    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...
    Loading...

    :hourglass_flowing_sand: Prop #82 Voters vs. Other & Recent Proposals

    The following three charts represent an overview of Prop #82 in comparision with Proposals from #1 to #100, that called as other proposals and the last two charts show the overall view of proposals that published after Prop #82, called as recent proposals (to #378).

    As of first chart bellow, can be seen average casted vote on other proposals are the same as prop #82, and total casted votes and total count of voters were below 4K and 3K, respectively.

    But after proposal #82, to #206, total casted votes and total count of voters dramatically increased to over 57.6K and 52.8K, respectively, then fell to bellow 20K to the most recent proposal (#378).

    Loading...

    :hourglass_flowing_sand: Prop #82 Voting Over Time by Hour

    Bar charts bellow show the casted votes, the number of unique voters and extra votes count (votes more than once time) by vote type by hour for Prop #82.

    :mag_right: findings:

    • As of charts above, the count of casted votes and extra voters to say YES, increased over voting period (Dec 1th till 4th, 2021).

    :hourglass_flowing_sand: Atom Whales, Validators & Regular Prop #82 Voters

    :mag_right: findings:

    The visuals in this sections show the voting type of voters by average size of wallets by their ATOM balance and in terms of first voting and validator voters.

    As its observed, the average wallet size of voters was 60.8 $ATOM.

    In Average, 1776 of votes weight casted by regular voters(Voters who votes more than one time in total and not a validator), and 60 of them voted for first time, and 32 of them was a validator.

    :mag_right: findings:

    As of PIE chart above, 24.4% of voters who changed their vote, switched from NO WITH VETO to YES vote, that followed by NO WITH VETO to NO with 20%.

    Among all voters 2.68% of them changed their votes after first voting.

    Among 42 addresses that changed their votes, only one address of them was belong to validators and rest of them belong to regular addresses.

    db_img